Vitalik Buterin: Ethereum is a Decentralized Consensus Platform
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The following is a quick exposition of an idea I had for improving the Vitalik buterin ethereum faucet model by merging in some of the benefits of DAOs, but doing so in a way that minimizes complexity and risk. The idea is as follows. Once the contribution period ends, the ability to contribute ETH stops, and the initial token balances are set; from there on the tokens can become tradeable. After the contribution period, the contract has one major state variable: The tap determines the amount per second that the development vitalik buterin ethereum faucet can take out of the contract.
This can be implemented as follows:. There is also a mechanism by which the token holders can vote on resolutions. Vitalik buterin ethereum faucet are two types of resolutions:. Either resolution can pass by some kind of majority vote with a quorum eg.
Note that lowering the tap by vote is not possible; the owner can voluntarily lower the tap, but they cannot unilaterally raise it. The intention is that the voters start off by giving the development team a reasonable and not-too-high monthly budget, and raise it over time as the team demonstrates its ability to competently execute with its existing budget.
However, vitalik buterin ethereum faucet a DAICO these risks are minimized, requiring both the developer and the vote to be compromised to cause any real damage:. This is definitely a more responsible way to carry out ICOswhere at least the development teams remuneration is tied to their actual performance. Though I see a problem with using this model, where the dev team holds a high percentage of the total token supply. Also another potential problem with using this model is that for token holders to propose to reduce the tap or vitalik buterin ethereum faucet self -destruct the contract might not actually be in their self interest.
Suppose that the price of the token vitalik buterin ethereum faucet reaches more than 5x to 6x its ICO price, if the dev team are irresponsible with the money or are not hitting their milestones, token holders will still be motivated to raise the tap or keep the status quo.
Doing anything other than that would have a largely negative effect on the price, and although token holders do care about the project they will care about the value of their tokens more. I see a problem with using this model, where the dev team holds a high percentage of the total token supply. I think this can be mitigated by equally distributing their token allocation alongside the ETH they get, based on the same tap mechanism, or another simple XX months vesting period to start with?
That being said, I see two different issues: This could attribute vitalik buterin ethereum faucet a big voting power which could be vitalik buterin ethereum faucet by a team to easily buy votes.
And how can we prevent having to constantly vote on resolutions on the same topic? A time limit in between resolutions could be an idea here.
I think it can be vitalik buterin ethereum faucet great model for ICOs which both the team and the investors can benefit from. However, one issue is that token holders might vote for self-destruction when price gets a lower than the funds left in the DAICO.
Vitalik buterin ethereum faucet bans Bitcoin again. I think about two possible improvements to enhance this mechanism in order to make it less vulnerable and more fair. Though that would assume that the market is reasonable and all the actors in the market are being perfectly rational. Vitalik buterin ethereum faucet now there are plenty of tokens that should be worth zero vitalik buterin ethereum faucet are trading for millions of dollars despite missing milestones and their development targets.
Most tokens do not trade on fundamentals and investors are more than happy to speculate on them. The point I am getting at is that in order to improve on the current vitalik buterin ethereum faucet of ICOs we have to be able to avoid the pitfalls that have been plaguing it from its inception.
If we want better ICOs we have to stop assuming that investors will be rational and will always make the best decision whether in the short run or long run. If you look at the blatant manipulation happening right now in crypto, what is to stop a malicious actor from influencing the vote through social media channels,etc.
The actor might be able to manipulate voters to make a decision that would be harmful to the project. The only way I see that this could be solved, would be to have a smart contract that would control the tap of funds based on tangible outcomes rather than a vote by all the token holders.
Tangible outcomes referring to whether a prototype has been built, is it vitalik buterin ethereum faucet alpha or beta useis it being utilised for transactions or some other metric. As long as the metric can be quantified and vitalik buterin ethereum faucet in the smart contract it could be used as a benchmark to measure the ICOs performance.
Using ds-auth or the DSAuthority pattern you can create any type of governance mechanism you can think of completely separate from your smart contracts. MKR like governance can be a good start. Allow voting only after the token price gets stable for a predetermined time period. This can decrease the amount of votes derived from big price changes. Would you contact an oracle? Is it the developer team or anyone with a vote?
Keep in mind that the possibillity of voting in such a scenario would create the incentive for many people to place buy orders slightly above the refund price, as they would know that their downside is limited.
I do agree with you about that, however, since lots of ICOs gets just a little attention I do think they are still vulnerable to price manipulations which might cause this. I am not sure about a solution for that or if a solution is really needed but I do think there should be a mechanism to protect ICO teams from malicious manipulations. This can help the team work on the project without worrying about someone shutting it down until the market gets a bit bigger and harder to manipulate.
If they do buy lambos with it the project will be shut down and vitalik buterin ethereum faucet will probably sue the teambut as long as the team is honest this can help the project grow faster. Feel free to add your comments and help me! Your feedback will be highly appreciated. Another thing to consider is maybe letting each contributor set the tap-rate of their own contribution. That way, project owners gain little by contributing to their own project perhaps they still gain positive feedback of having more apparent investors.
This is a logical step in ICO evolution. The prototype code is here consider it alpha: I like the tap mechanism, but I think the value stems from not releasing funds to projects in a lump sump all at once. That way investors can vitalik buterin ethereum faucet founders accountable throughout the development lifecycle. There a lots of ways that can be achieved other than the tap mechanism that might work just as well.
I proposed a similar mechanism for the 1Hive project that uses a continuous token model where newly minted tokens fund a reserve, and investors can exit by pulling out their pro-rata share at any time. Funds in the reserve move into the projects discretionary fund over time, very similar to how the tap mechanism works.
Discussion about 1Hive can be found here. This process combines with some governance over new token minting would emulate the more typical startup funding process where founders have to convince their existing investors that they should dilute shares as well as show progress in order to unlock further funding.
This is exactly what we are working on at coincrowd. Any way we felt the ICO place is like a far west and need some rules. Not only from vitalik buterin ethereum faucet but directly vitalik buterin ethereum faucet from DAO.
This si the reason why we start building coincrowd. This is another experience we get from consultantcy for other in ICOs some new project that decide to run an ICO today have a strong community, but this community often is outside of crypto, and to partecipate in ICO for them is very hard. With coincrowd wallet we reduce the effort. Hi start to collaborate to the paper. We solved the problems with the trust of participants in their smart contract for Vitalik buterin ethereum faucet, we realized a refund on request.
That is, if there is a mistrust of the project - you can return the tokens back to the address of the contract and launch a refund in the private office of the platform throughout the period of the Pre-ICO and ICO. For this we used:. I love the simplicity of it. My only alteration would be to replace the voting on shutdown with an option to cash out your token at any point. So if the fund raised ether and sold tokens then at the start, vitalik buterin ethereum faucet can be redeemed for 1 ether.
As the DAO vitalik buterin ethereum faucet ether from the tap, the redeem rate falls. This way people can individually secede without the need for democratic shutdown. You can then measure displeasure by the rate of liquidation rather than it being a vitalik buterin ethereum faucet event. This can reduce chances of random price drops to affect the project, as token holders can vitalik buterin ethereum faucet vote at the agreed delivery dates.
Removes volatility and speculation from the equation. For this we used: Payment and refund by other crypto-currencies My Vision: Realize monitoring the cost of the Oracle tokens to allow voting at a low threshold of the cost of the tokens Add a function to reduce the vitalik buterin ethereum faucet charges when the value of tokens on the exchanges decreases To freeze tokens for days after each move of tokens to other purse addresses, to reduce the possibility of pumps or dumps Link to github.
