Shumukh alislam and bitcoin
Members of many forums offer their services as injection writers, referring to creation of malware designed to be integrated into a specific banking Trojan horse generally based on Zeus , tailored to the specific bank, which imitates the design of its windows, etc. In , we saw this field prosper, with at least seven similar services offered on the various forums. This year we witnessed a not insignificant amount of ransomware for sale on Russian-speaking forums.
It would appear that the forums see a strong potential for profit through this attack vector and therefore invest in the development of ransomware. Furthermore, note that some of the ransomware uses the Tor network to better conceal the command and control servers. Since CryptoLocker was discovered in September , we have seen numerous attempts at developing similar malware both for PCs and laptops.
The intelligence world has undergone dramatic change in recent years. The growth in traffic, online platforms, applications, devices and users has made the intelligence gathering process much more complex and challenging. Today, each individual makes multiple simultaneous online appearances.
We are also active on professional networks, such as LinkedIn. We participate in discussion groups and forums. We share pictures and videos via dedicated websites, and we process transactions by way of ecommerce sites, etc. This makes it much harder today to track the online footsteps of an individual and connect the dots between his diverse online representations, especially if he uses multiple aliases and email addresses.
I will give you an example — in order to access a particular Russian closed hacking forum, you must write posts, receive a recommendation from the administrator of the forum and finally, pay 50 dollars in Bitcoin. Such a task cannot be accomplished by a crawler or an automated tool. You must have an analyst that understands the relevant ecosystem and who is also familiar with the specific slang or lingo of the forum members. If we take a look at the threat actors in the world of cyber security, we can roughly divide them into four categories: A third category is cyber criminals we have recently heard about cybercrime activities organized by groups in Ukraine, Eastern Europe, China and Latin America.
And indeed, we are witnessing attacks on media organizations, public records and in recent months attacks against healthcare services, mainly for the purpose of extortion , academic institutions, banks, the energy sector, and, of course, government agencies. These diverse threat actors use the Internet to chat, plan their attacks, publish target lists, and even upload and share attack tools.
But where can we find them? They have different online platforms. Unlike APT campaigns that have almost no online footprint, the strength of hacktivism is its capability to recruit large masses for its operations, using social networks. Cyber terrorists are mostly active on closed, dedicated forums where you must login with a username and password after receiving admin approval.
We have experience with such forums in Arabic, Persian and even Turkish. Cyber criminals, on the other hand, can be found on Darknet platforms, where you need to use a special browser to gain access. They can also be found on password-protected forums that sometimes require an entrance fee, payable in Bitcoin or other crypto-currencies.
On these platforms we can find sophisticated attack tools for sale, pieces of advanced code, zero-day exploits, stolen data dumps and more. Regarding governments or state-sponsored groups, I do not believe that they chat online, and generally speaking they do not leave footprints on the Web.
However, we occasionally uncover activities by nation-state actors, such as the Syrian Electronic Army SEA or Iranian-affiliated groups. Recent years have witnessed an increased awareness within the worldwide security community of risks related to cyber attacks against critical infrastructures.
On January 2, , the Cryptome. The connection to the Iranian group is unclear, despite the fact that Parastoo has mentioned that it has been testing national critical infrastructures using cyber vectors. The act neutralized some local services and temporarily disrupted cell phone service in the area. The perpetrators also fired shots from high-powered rifles at several transformers in the facility.
Ten were damaged and several others shut down. It should be noted that there have been several attacks against different infrastructure facilities in the U.
Furthermore, officials conceded that the electric power industry is focusing on the threat of cyber attacks. The Iranian hacker group Parastoo first emerged on November 25, , when they posted a message announcing they hacked into the International Atomic Energy Agency IAEA and leaked personal details of its officials.
In February , Parastoo claimed to have stolen nuclear information, credit card information, and the personal identities of thousands of customers, including individuals associated with the U. On May 6, the cryptome.
In an email sent to the website, the attack was declared to be a warning to decision-makers in Israel, evoking alleged Israeli Air Force IAF attacks on Syrian territory at the beginning of May The claim of responsibility for the attack was accompanied by a.
Control of this system would present the hacker with numerous capabilities, among which is the destruction of the agricultural yield. We also noticed that the time shown on the screenshot indicated the end of April The Syrian Electronic Army posted a denial via its Twitter account, where it stated that it was not behind the attack.
It should be noted that there are numerous examples of fictitious claims of responsibility intended to deflect identification of the attacker MO Modus Operandi of state-sponsored hacker groups. However, in our view, this event is unprecedented. Cyber criminals, on the other hand, can be found on Darknet platforms, where you need to use a special browser to gain access. They can also be found on password-protected forums that sometimes require an entrance fee, payable in Bitcoin or other crypto-currencies.
On these platforms we can find sophisticated attack tools for sale, pieces of advanced code, zero-day exploits, stolen data dumps and more. Regarding governments or state-sponsored groups, I do not believe that they chat online, and generally speaking they do not leave footprints on the Web. However, we occasionally uncover activities by nation-state actors, such as the Syrian Electronic Army SEA or Iranian-affiliated groups.
Recent years have witnessed an increased awareness within the worldwide security community of risks related to cyber attacks against critical infrastructures. On January 2, , the Cryptome. The connection to the Iranian group is unclear, despite the fact that Parastoo has mentioned that it has been testing national critical infrastructures using cyber vectors.
The act neutralized some local services and temporarily disrupted cell phone service in the area. The perpetrators also fired shots from high-powered rifles at several transformers in the facility.
Ten were damaged and several others shut down. It should be noted that there have been several attacks against different infrastructure facilities in the U.
Furthermore, officials conceded that the electric power industry is focusing on the threat of cyber attacks. The Iranian hacker group Parastoo first emerged on November 25, , when they posted a message announcing they hacked into the International Atomic Energy Agency IAEA and leaked personal details of its officials.
In February , Parastoo claimed to have stolen nuclear information, credit card information, and the personal identities of thousands of customers, including individuals associated with the U. On May 6, the cryptome. In an email sent to the website, the attack was declared to be a warning to decision-makers in Israel, evoking alleged Israeli Air Force IAF attacks on Syrian territory at the beginning of May The claim of responsibility for the attack was accompanied by a. Control of this system would present the hacker with numerous capabilities, among which is the destruction of the agricultural yield.
We also noticed that the time shown on the screenshot indicated the end of April The Syrian Electronic Army posted a denial via its Twitter account, where it stated that it was not behind the attack. It should be noted that there are numerous examples of fictitious claims of responsibility intended to deflect identification of the attacker MO Modus Operandi of state-sponsored hacker groups. However, in our view, this event is unprecedented. For the first time in public, a critical computerized infrastructure facility on Israeli soil has been attacked, and it is extremely likely that a sovereign state is behind the attack, declaring outright war in the cyber arena and deviating from the intelligence-gathering plateau.
On June 11, , a prominent Web Jihadist from the Shumukh al-Islam forum, Yaman Mukhaddab , launched a campaign to recruit male and female volunteers for a new Electronic Jihad group. Simply put, it is a cyber-terror base, for launching electronic terror attacks on major infidel powers, specifically the U. Mukhaddab goes on to list the main targets for future attacks. The second priority includes control systems of general financial sites, such as central savings organizations, stock markets and major banks.
Mukhaddab details the desired skills of anyone wishing to join the group, including: Members who want to volunteer are asked to post a response in the thread, specifying the categories that fit their capabilities. We have yet to see indications that this newly formed group has started to engage in online hacking activity, but given the enthusiasm it created among forum members, this is likely to occur in the near future. Cyber Threats to a Bank — Part 1: The ICR has leaked a great amount of data, most of which is not up-to-date.
Our analysis additionally revealed that the leaked data does not originate from the IAA local network, but either from its open and public network or from a different server that contains such information. ICR executed their first act on February 25, , when the group leaked the personal details of Bahraini intelligence and high-ranking military personnel. According to the semi-official Iranian Fars News Agency, the group has declared that it is not affiliated with Hezbollah. However, it seems that wikileak.
Additionally, the Twitter account quickleak.