Maaku bitcoin stock price
Now where does the coin reside? But there is no need that the best analogies need to be physically intutive, in fact basically all of higher mathmatics is about manipulating abstractions which are in no way physically intutive. I think relating to a payments ability to require transferable restrictions on the next transaction.
But make the covenants temporary, the coins themselves perishable, or applied to user issued assets not colored coins but separately issued assets a la freimarkets , and it is a different story IMHO. Some of your competition doesn't mind disclosing this however.
I think they should just take the scheme we discussed previously and execute it under a ZKP for general programs. It would be similar in size to the zerocash proofs.
Verifer does this too. Both prover and verifier get a hash root. The verifyer verifies the signature and the zkp. But it shouldn't be terrible. I believe it would be cheaper than another sha hash in any case. Or of an encrypted value or.. I think not, at least not with the GGPR12 stuff as the arith circuit field size is set by the size of the pairing crypto curve.
You could get more elaborate, like timelocking the funds and show that funds beyond the withdraw daily limits are actually unspendable by the network, but perhaps I'm getting to cipherpunk there. I'm thinking for a merklized AST what makes sense is merklized forth. The forth dictionary concept is perfect for it, and means you have a simple, easy to implement language already used for embedded andother things and bitcoin scripting along with all the usual nice things like editor modes and what not So you've got your parameter stack and return stack, and are thus at the point where you can recreate Bitcoin scripting.
Now the interesting thing to do is add TPM functionality, which means a PCR opcode and stack to allow you to select what you want to consider as the start of the current trusted block of code. Then add an encrypted stack, as expected encrypted with H sec PCR tip , and some sort of monotonic counter thing. That should give you enough to do trusted computing with an extremely stable API, and that API itself can be just AST heads of useful library function calls that may actually be implemented directly in C or whatever rather than the opcodes themselves.
I don't know that explicitly supporting that makes sense.. Equally, forth is already common in applications, IE spacecraft, where you need relatively bare metal languages with simple frameworks and symantics; note how with forth it's much easier to get to the level where you trust that the code being run is what you actually wrote than, say, C.
Equally, forth is already common in applications, IE spacecraft, where you need relatively bare metal languages with simple frameworks and symantics; note how with forth it's much easier to get to the level where you trust that the Just be clear what the maximum's are for the variou parts of the stack. Dunno yet what the stack datatype should be, MPI's are nice but there is the subtle issue that it'd be good to have some clear idea of how many operations an operation takes. Of course, really simple would be bit ints and implement everything higher level in forth.
Maybe a merkle mountain range of every value ever associated with a given key? I mentioned to TD earlier today the idea of miners committing to a merkle tree of txids in their mempool, just to prove visibility, you could use that if the commitment included txins being spent. Appending needs to touch only the "mountain tips", that is the perfect merkle trees already stored, and for n items stored you'll have log2 n trees.
I've got an idea where you'd make transactions have commitments of previous ones with a merkle-mountain-range-like scheme so you could efficiently reference any previous transaction up to the genesis block. This is easiest to understand if transactions can only have linear history, but a dag history is doable too. Anyway, wallet software would receive that history to know the coins are valid, thus pushing validation directly to the users.
Obviously some way of pruning that history is important, SCIP is heavy-weight and complex but could work. So one possible accumulator would be to construct a merkle tree of a bit field with one bit for every integer between 0 and 2 You can prove you added an integer to that set by showing the leaves for an operation updating the appropriate bit, and you can remove an integer with another set of leaves.
Also because they inherently invoke a trade-off. Bitcoin-specific auction, where only one bid is valid, bidders must provably commit funds to an auction, and more. This results in added traffic on the blockchain, but instant secure payments. Atomic-swap-to-X seems like something we'll want to ddo. It's easy to me to list my own ideas because I have them already listed in my blog.
Digital Signature Protocol for Massive bulk verifications an extension to Guy-Fawkes signatures http: How to reward nodes that relay txs https: Still another protocol to reward nodes that relay txs https: How to prevent wallet theft someone discovered a bug in this protocol, but I don't remeber what w was it https: Increasing the Network Hashing Power by reducing block propagation time https: Still More New Opcodes proposal https: Destination Address Anonymization in Bitcoin, August 6, https: A clean solution to ALL Bitcoin problems: SatoshiDice, Block size, future fees.
CoVar and Restricted-CoVar https: Proof of Bet — An alternative to everything else https: Using the version field as more nonce space while maintaining backwards compatibility https: Peer Isolation for DoS prevention https: More on Double-Spend alert system https: Emulating multisig with DAA https: APPECoin, a system with total anonymization — key design points uses universal re-encryption and short ZNPs of shuffles, unfinished draft paper available on bitslog. Possible use for the double hash in blocks forward only second hash preimage https: A new protocol to achieve instant payments, March 20, https: The re-design of the Bitcoin block header, March 18, https: Safe merged-mining Protocol, February 20, https: Strict memory hard hash functions, December 31, https: Group Signatures with proposed Trapdoor threshold anonymity property, July 30, https: P2pTradeX Protocol, July 05, https: Proof of unique blockchain storage, November 3, https: Improved Proof-of-work function with decentralization incentives, July 5, https: I would really like to see the master index published.
Please, send me a link to it when it's ready. Thanks for your effort to collect the ideas. I have proposed many in the past 3 years and it is difficult even for me to collect them. Gavin doesn't like this idea: Support shorter hash and public key for micro-payment and short-term storage to save block space. CryptoPayment bitcoin wiki cryptopayment spam spam-prevention.
I think the most fundemental thing I've discovered is the concepts of how mining can be separated into timestamping and proof-of-publication Is it back in your possession now? What if that data has been further split into multiple parts with an error correcting code and spread to multiple machines. Now where does the coin reside?
But there is no need that the best analogies need to be physically intutive, in fact basically all of higher mathmatics is about manipulating abstractions which are in no way physically intutive.
I think relating to a payments ability to require transferable restrictions on the next transaction. But make the covenants temporary, the coins themselves perishable, or applied to user issued assets not colored coins but separately issued assets a la freimarkets , and it is a different story IMHO. Some of your competition doesn't mind disclosing this however.
I think they should just take the scheme we discussed previously and execute it under a ZKP for general programs. It would be similar in size to the zerocash proofs. Verifer does this too. Both prover and verifier get a hash root.
The verifyer verifies the signature and the zkp. But it shouldn't be terrible. I believe it would be cheaper than another sha hash in any case. Or of an encrypted value or..
I think not, at least not with the GGPR12 stuff as the arith circuit field size is set by the size of the pairing crypto curve. You could get more elaborate, like timelocking the funds and show that funds beyond the withdraw daily limits are actually unspendable by the network, but perhaps I'm getting to cipherpunk there.
I'm thinking for a merklized AST what makes sense is merklized forth. The forth dictionary concept is perfect for it, and means you have a simple, easy to implement language already used for embedded andother things and bitcoin scripting along with all the usual nice things like editor modes and what not So you've got your parameter stack and return stack, and are thus at the point where you can recreate Bitcoin scripting.
Now the interesting thing to do is add TPM functionality, which means a PCR opcode and stack to allow you to select what you want to consider as the start of the current trusted block of code.
Then add an encrypted stack, as expected encrypted with H sec PCR tip , and some sort of monotonic counter thing. That should give you enough to do trusted computing with an extremely stable API, and that API itself can be just AST heads of useful library function calls that may actually be implemented directly in C or whatever rather than the opcodes themselves. I don't know that explicitly supporting that makes sense..
Equally, forth is already common in applications, IE spacecraft, where you need relatively bare metal languages with simple frameworks and symantics; note how with forth it's much easier to get to the level where you trust that the code being run is what you actually wrote than, say, C. Equally, forth is already common in applications, IE spacecraft, where you need relatively bare metal languages with simple frameworks and symantics; note how with forth it's much easier to get to the level where you trust that the Just be clear what the maximum's are for the variou parts of the stack.
Dunno yet what the stack datatype should be, MPI's are nice but there is the subtle issue that it'd be good to have some clear idea of how many operations an operation takes. Of course, really simple would be bit ints and implement everything higher level in forth. Maybe a merkle mountain range of every value ever associated with a given key?
I mentioned to TD earlier today the idea of miners committing to a merkle tree of txids in their mempool, just to prove visibility, you could use that if the commitment included txins being spent. Appending needs to touch only the "mountain tips", that is the perfect merkle trees already stored, and for n items stored you'll have log2 n trees.
I've got an idea where you'd make transactions have commitments of previous ones with a merkle-mountain-range-like scheme so you could efficiently reference any previous transaction up to the genesis block. This is easiest to understand if transactions can only have linear history, but a dag history is doable too. Anyway, wallet software would receive that history to know the coins are valid, thus pushing validation directly to the users. Obviously some way of pruning that history is important, SCIP is heavy-weight and complex but could work.
So one possible accumulator would be to construct a merkle tree of a bit field with one bit for every integer between 0 and 2 You can prove you added an integer to that set by showing the leaves for an operation updating the appropriate bit, and you can remove an integer with another set of leaves. Also because they inherently invoke a trade-off. Bitcoin-specific auction, where only one bid is valid, bidders must provably commit funds to an auction, and more.
This results in added traffic on the blockchain, but instant secure payments. Atomic-swap-to-X seems like something we'll want to ddo. It's easy to me to list my own ideas because I have them already listed in my blog. Digital Signature Protocol for Massive bulk verifications an extension to Guy-Fawkes signatures http: How to reward nodes that relay txs https: Still another protocol to reward nodes that relay txs https: How to prevent wallet theft someone discovered a bug in this protocol, but I don't remeber what w was it https: Increasing the Network Hashing Power by reducing block propagation time https: Still More New Opcodes proposal https: Destination Address Anonymization in Bitcoin, August 6, https: A clean solution to ALL Bitcoin problems: SatoshiDice, Block size, future fees.
CoVar and Restricted-CoVar https: Proof of Bet — An alternative to everything else https: Using the version field as more nonce space while maintaining backwards compatibility https: Peer Isolation for DoS prevention https: More on Double-Spend alert system https: Emulating multisig with DAA https: APPECoin, a system with total anonymization — key design points uses universal re-encryption and short ZNPs of shuffles, unfinished draft paper available on bitslog.
Possible use for the double hash in blocks forward only second hash preimage https: A new protocol to achieve instant payments, March 20, https: The re-design of the Bitcoin block header, March 18, https: Safe merged-mining Protocol, February 20, https: Strict memory hard hash functions, December 31, https: Group Signatures with proposed Trapdoor threshold anonymity property, July 30, https: P2pTradeX Protocol, July 05, https: Proof of unique blockchain storage, November 3, https: Improved Proof-of-work function with decentralization incentives, July 5, https: I would really like to see the master index published.
Please, send me a link to it when it's ready. Thanks for your effort to collect the ideas. I have proposed many in the past 3 years and it is difficult even for me to collect them.