Trade unions in britain today by john mcilroy scotland
Regrettably, the authors do not describe exactly what restraints were put on union action. Under the terms of the York Memo, no union could take strike action until a lengthy procedure had been exhausted. If no agreement was reached at shop level, the matter was referred to the Works Committee at factory or enterprise level. And there was no guarantee that the matter in dispute would be resolved at York at the first monthly meeting.
It might take months for a dispute to be resolved through the procedure — a procedure from which the direct representatives of the workers or the factory involved, the shop stewards, were excluded.
There was no question of the disputed change being postponed while the procedure was gone through. No union could call an official strike until the whole lengthy and wearisome procedure had been exhausted. No wonder that in these circumstances the workers and shop stewards avoided getting involved in this lengthy procedure and took strike action — which by definition was unofficial, and which the unions had to condemn if they were not to breach the terms of the York Memo.
Thus the atmosphere that prevailed in engineering factories was one of lack of confidence in the official union structures and reliance on action from below, led by shop stewards, in defiance of full-time union officials.
For example, this reviewer was secretary of a combine committee comprising shop stewards from 10 factories in the textile machinery makers combine. There were similar committees in the motor industry. But these were not recognised either by the unions or by the employers. It is clear from the whole history of industrial relations during the period covered, from to , that an important factor determining wages and conditions was not official union action, but rank-and-file activity and unofficial action, and that the shop stewards were the organisers, leaders and coordinators of these struggles.
Tables of the movement of real wages are included in these volumes. They show that in the 20 years covered in Volume 1, from to , real wages rose in 14 of those years from an index of Elsewhere, McIlroy and Campbell, basing themselves on different sources, give a much higher figure of some 30 per cent rise during , which seems rather high if we are talking of real wages, taking inflation into account.
The main factor making this increase possible was, of course, the general state of the economy, the prolonged postwar boom. This is demonstrated by the fact that the fluctuations in real wages up or down coincide with the course of political-industrial struggles. For example, was a year when real wages went down sharply, by over five per cent. Real wages rose again during this period by over four per cent.
The interventions of the state and the relations between the unions and the Conservative and Labour Parties and governments are covered in several chapters. These relations varied considerably. Obviously the relations between the unions and the Labour Party were very different from those between the unions and the Conservative Party.
The Labour Party was created by the unions to be their political voice, and in fact they were an organic part of it at both local and national levels. The Conservative Party was identified with big business and landed interests. However, despite this important difference, they were both united in their commitment to managing a capitalist economy.
And since the unions themselves accepted wholeheartedly that their task was not to overthrow capitalism but to work within it, this made collaboration possible. The parties approached the task in different ways, ranging from collaboration to confrontation with the unions.
Naturally their different social bases affected the way they approached this task, but it would be over-simplistic to say that the relationship between Labour governments and unions was always one of collaboration, while that between Tory governments and unions was always one of confrontation. The employers and their political representatives employed a variety of strategies.
For example, one of the main concerns of the Tories when they came to power in was to continue the collaboration between unions and state established during the war. Nina Fishman, in a chapter on this strike, quotes the brief supplied by Macleod to Macmillan for a meeting with the employers:. The general ideology of both Conservative and Labour governments right from the end of the war to the s was one of corporatism, an attempt to involve employers, unions and government in tripartite institutions.
In particular, this involved an attempt to integrate the unions into the establishment; hoping that in exchange for concessions on social issues such as pensions, food subsidies, rent controls, etc, and the feeling that they were involved in decisions on high-level policy, the unions would moderate wage claims, and control their own rank and file. However, by the late s this was coming apart. Andrew Thorpe, in his chapter on the Labour Party and the unions, summarises what happened.
One result was a degree of union militancy directed squarely at the White Paper. This came at all levels. By the end of April , 14 union executives had supported a call for a special Trades Union Congress to be held to condemn the plans. There were demonstrations and strikes… it was the more militant sections of the rank and file rather than the union leadership that initiated the main challenge to In Place of Strife.
But the repercussions were felt at the very highest levels, with political humiliation for Castle, and severe embarrassment for Wilson, who had supported her.
When the Tory government succeeded Labour in , it also embarked on an attempt to police the unions. But its Industrial Relations Act was met with the same opposition as had In Place of Strife , failed to curb union militancy, and was repealed by the Labour government.
It was only after the period covered by these volumes that the confrontation with the unions led by Margaret Thatcher, resulting in the defeats of the printers and the miners, finally drastically swung the balance of power against the unions and in favour of the employers. On the one hand, as the authors make abundantly clear, these leaderships, accepting the framework of capitalist social relations, were quite happy to accept the corporatist ideology, participate in tripartite bodies, and convince themselves that they were a valued part of the state machine.
On the other hand, even the most bureaucratised unions were still basically democratic institutions. For example, in one of the most bureaucratised, the Transport and General Workers Union, though all the officials are appointed for life until they retire , the national, trade section and regional executives are composed of elected lay members. Thus they have to respond to and reflect rank-and-file opinion, and call official strikes and come into conflict with the employers and even the state, as the accounts in these volumes show.
I have one minor quibble. Describing the controversy over Order , the authors write: These books provide ample evidence for the effectiveness of trade union action in determining wages and conditions. However, they also highlight the limitations of trade union militancy, and provide no comfort for those on the Marxist left who believe that industrial struggles lead almost automatically to socialist consciousness and, if sufficiently extended, to a direct struggle for working-class power.
What stands out is that despite the fact that in many cases Communist Party and Trotskyist militants won substantial influence and support and led significant struggles, and achieved areas of influence in the unions, this influence and support was rarely reflected in political gains and membership.
Although the SWP over a period in the s was very active in the trade unions, publishing rank-and-file papers for car workers, miners, hospital workers, teachers, NALGO, dock workers, building workers, GEC rank and file, etc.
Yet here, too, they were not able to translate this support into political allegiance based on a conscious acceptance of a socialist ideology, Marxist or other, among more than a handful of workers. No doubt it will be — indeed, is — argued that these failures to develop mass political influence were due to defeats in particular struggles for example the Blue Union struggle , mistakes in strategy and tactics and to other factors, for example, the nefarious activities of one Gerry Healy or unhealthy internal regimes.
But in reality the explanation is much more general. Firstly, the general economic and political situation, the context of expanding capitalism, and a long postwar boom in which workers were able to win substantial improvements by industrial action, and during which governments, both Conservative and Labour, were anxious to preserve social peace by concessions and reform, was not propitious for revolutionary politics. But though they were political in the sense that they were directed against state policies, their aim was limited — to force the government of the day to retreat, not to overthrow it, or to demand that it carry out a completely socialist policy.
Certainly they did not go anywhere near creating a situation of dual power in which grass-roots working-class institutions competed with the state machine for power.
Unfortunately, the authors have nothing to say on what actually went on inside the shipyards during the 15 months of occupation, on how work was continued on ships, on how steel and power were acquired and how paid for, etc. Perhaps we can outline the scenario which might have developed, and which no doubt many on the Marxist left were hoping would develop.
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. History of trade unions in the United Kingdom. United Kingdom labour law. European Convention on Human Rights art Edwards v Halliwell [] 2 All ER Organised labour portal United Kingdom portal. Mitchell, "Where traditional Tories fear to tread: Mrs Thatcher's trade union policy. Retrieved 28 June Trade unions in Europe. Economy of the United Kingdom. Economic geography Free trade Gold standard Recessions and recoveries National champions policy Economic liberalism Privatisation Nationalisation.
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