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Glad we could do this today on a Monday. We have about 30 minutes. DAS Wong will open up with some remarks on — about Indo-Pacific strategy and the — obviously to take your questions. Good to be here with all of you.
And what I cover is regional and security policy. So multilateral, security, strategic issues, I cover. Under that portfolio, the main focus of my time right now is the Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy, and I want to talk a little bit more about that today so you and your readers can fully understand what we mean by that. If you look at the first year of the Trump administration, it was a significant year in terms of U.
He hosted a number of leaders at Mar-a-Lago and for state visits. On top of that, we sent a number of cabinet officials on trips to the region — from the secretary of defense to the secretary of state and others — and we capped the year with a historic trip by the President to the Indo-Pacific, which was the longest trip a president has taken to the region in a generation. So looking back on the first year, we really consider the first year a year of introducing the strategic concept.
But now as we look to the second, third, and fourth year of at least the first term of the Trump administration, these are really years of formulation and implementation of the strategy.
So by free we mean, first of all, the international plane. We want the nations of the Indo-Pacific to be free from coercion, that they can pursue in a sovereign manner the paths they choose in the region. Secondly, we mean at the national level, we want the societies of the various Indo-Pacific countries to become progressively more free — free in terms of good governance, in terms of fundamental rights, in terms of transparency and anti-corruption. Moving on to open — by open, we first and foremost mean open sea lines of communication and open airways.
These open sea lines of communication are truly the lifeblood of the region. And if you look at world trade, with 50 percent of trade going through the Indo-Pacific along the sea routes, particularly through the South China Sea, open sea lanes and open airways in the Indo-Pacific are increasingly vital and important to the world. Secondly, we mean more open logistics — infrastructure. What is needed throughout the region to encourage greater regional integration, encourage greater economic growth?
We want to assist the region in doing infrastructure in the right way, infrastructure that truly does drive integration and raises the GDPs of the constituent economies, not weigh them down. We also mean more open investment. And we also mean more open trade. Free, fair, and reciprocal trade is something the United States has supported for decades and that the Trump administration supports.
But two things are different. First, as the economy — excuse me, as the population and the economic weight of the Indo-Pacific grows, our focus and our efforts in the region have to commensurately grow with it. Number one, it acknowledges the historical reality and the current-day reality that South Asia, and in particular India, plays a key role in the Pacific and in East Asia and in Southeast Asia. Secondly, it is in our interest, the U.
India is a nation that is invested in a free and open order. It is a democracy. So I think I will stop there and maybe open it up to questions and we can really talk about anything you guys would like.
So before we get started, I just want to remind everyone that we are on the record, and I think Robert said that earlier. So this is on the record, everyone. In describing the open quality of the Indo-Pacific, you talked about free trade. How does that tally with the imposition of tariffs and the pulling out of the TPP? So a couple of things.
The United States, as I said, for decades has supported free, fair, and reciprocal trade. We have one of the most open markets in the world where nations are allowed to trade and invest with us.
And both those numbers are going up. But when you talk about free, fair, and reciprocal trade, there are two parts to that. So you have to set the rules of the road. But number two, you have to enforce the rules of free trade. I think the nations of the region and a lot of strategic thinkers will understand that there are strategic benefits to a regional free trade pact that includes the United States and our partners in the region. Trade agreements are about economics.
Trade agreements are about ensuring, from the U. Number one, trade agreements, when done right, have to be approved by the U. So in order to have that long-term strategic value, in order to gain the strategic benefits that everyone acknowledges a trade agreement in principle would entail, you have to ensure there are those economic benefits and you have to ensure that U.
Could I have a follow-up on that? Lesley Wroughton from Reuters. But Secretary Mnuchin said recently that the U. And how do you see the Chinese move today affecting any sort of open-door policy to going back into TPP? So again, going back to what I said, trade agreements have to yield economic benefits for U. So if it is in the benefit of all, as the President said, to look at CPTPP 11, to look at other multilateral or regional type arrangements, if that is in the benefit of all, and particularly in the benefit of U.
Does a free trade agreement have to benefit all U. What I am saying is President Trump is focused on ensuring that there are benefits to U. Government, the previous U. In your remarks you said it is our interest that India play an increasingly weighty role in the region.
What do you mean about the weighty roles? What kind of role do you want India to play? Well, India for sure has the capability and potential to play a more — a more weighty role. That was, I think, the only — second — the second time that foreign leaders have been invited to that event, and a truly significant sign of the increasing ties that India is pursuing particularly in Southeast Asia.
There are a number of crisscrossing strategies throughout the region. And secondly, the deep inroads — inroads that China has made in Maldives — now it owns around nine islands there — does it any way threaten the free and open trade in Indo-Pacific region? The Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy is not just about China, and this is for the very simple reason that the region is much larger than China.
In India, we have 1. I want you to get the best information you can. You mentioned about the infrastructure support. I think Secretary Tillerson said that you — that he wants to propose alternative support mechanism.
So what — could you provide, like, the update, or is this administration going to really propose the alternative for the infrastructure support? So let me speak a little bit about what the U. We are more concerned with how that financing for infrastructure is structured, number one, and number two, how the particular infrastructure projects are conceived — conceived of and implemented.
So for decades, the United States has been advocating for strong connectivity principles, facilitating good connectivity projects, preparing the investment frameworks and the investment environments in the region to drive private capital to these types of projects. It can only be filled by getting private sector money off the sidelines. But there is a problem right now in the Indo-Pacific. If you look at the developed world, for every one dollar in state financing that goes to infrastructure, you get two dollars in private capital.
But in the Indo-Pacific, for every one dollar in state financing, you only get 30 cents of private capital into these projects. And then if we can do that, we can fill that infrastructure gap, provide the alternatives that are needed by the nations of the region, so that infrastructure is done right and truly ensures economic growth. Over the past year, the Trump administration has pursued a maximum pressure campaign on North Korea.
And this has created the conditions now where we can have these talks that are moving towards our clear objective, which is complete, irreversible, and verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
Kim just went to visit Xi in Beijing. I wanted to ask you — you talked a little bit about countries free of coercion from outside powers. Does that explicitly apply to Taiwan? And if you could talk a little bit about your recent visit there. What message does the Trump administration have for China about Taiwan?
Well, our — we have a longstanding policy with regard to Taiwan as encapsulated in the Taiwan Relations Act and the three joint communiques.
And the basis or the core of that policy is to a deepen relations with the Taiwan people and b provide them with adequate military arms so they can defend their democracy. And if you look at Taiwan, they truly are an example for the region for the types of reforms that we want to encourage throughout the region: So to that extent, we are pursuing the longstanding policy with regard to Taiwan, again, under the TRA and the three joint communiques.
We want these nations to work cooperatively, to work by consensus, to pursue shared goals of strengthening the free and open order. Is that supposed to be included in the three communiques, or One quick follow-up on the North Korea. Are — is everyone still working under the assumption that these — that the summit will be in May?
What did President Trump mean in his speech in Ohio when he said that he might delay the implementation of the trade deal in South Korea? Because you just spent most of the time talking about trade, so this is a trade issue. This is a broad — this is broader than just a trade issue. He said — the President said — that this is — he would — he might delay it so that you could increase your leverage in the North Korea negotiations.
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